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Abstract: The starting point to the analyzes presented in this paper is the fact that the primary task for the nervous 
system – both central and peripheral – of living creatures is the control of movements. The only result of any mental 
process, the only way to influence the environment, aimed at producing desired results in environment, is the 
movement. These issues make the subject of the discipline of science termed motor control. In this field, the efficiency 
of mathematics is highly disputable. On the other hand, the promising tool for knowledge ordering seems to be the 
systems theory. For its invention Ludwig von Bertalanffy is credited (1968). However, already in late 1940s such an 
approach has been presented by Nikolai A. Bernstein. His theory is commonly regarded as a cornerstone of modern 
motor control. Basing on evolutionary and neurophysiological knowledge, he invented a systemic model termed “brain 
skyscraper”, structural in its essence. It was possible to invent the slightly simplified, parallel model of functional 
nature, termed “modalities’ ladder”, founding upon information processing. The practical application of the ladder in 
teaching of motor operations, presented in this paper, is termed “one level higher” principle. An important outcome of 
the modalities’ ladder is also its specific, function oriented, systemic ordering of motor control terminology. 
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1 Introduction 
 In contemporary world the biomechanical 
analyzes – both qualitative and quantitative – are no 
doubt very important elements of the motor activities 
improvement. The central subject of such analyzes is 
the movement, especially in sport. Nevertheless, as it 
aptly philosopher Andrzej Wohl remarked, “whole 
human history is the history of human activities; all 
that we dispose of, all what constitutes the resource of 
our culture, all the pieces of art, science and 
technology – all that results from motor activities” [1]. 
In this respect, very instructively sound also the 
words by psychologist James W. Kalat, who stated: 
A great brain without muscles would be like a 
computer without a monitor, printer, or other 
output. No matter how powerful the internal 
processing, it would be useless. Nevertheless, 
most psychology texts ignore movement (my 
emphasis – WP), and journals have few 
articles about it [2]. 
Therefore, the movement makes a final link of 
a complex, cause-effect chain, in living beings 
encompassing physical, physiological and 
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psychological phenomena and processes. It seems 
hardly possible that the researches into merely final 
link of such a long and complex chain will enable 
creation of useful explanations and yield productive 
results. 
While taking into account the advice by 
mathematicians and physicists Alan Sokal and Jean 
Bricmont that “it’s a good idea to know, what one is 
talking about”[3], let us take an assumption that we 
will focus our attention not on every motor activity, 
but only on such, which is intentionally deliberated to 
induce desirable changes in environment. Let us term 
such a motor phenomenon motor operation. It 
occurs in reality and may be observed with biological 
senses and/or measured with physical and technical 
gauges. However, to appear in reality, it has to be 
prepared in advance in mind. To reduce intellectual 
costs of such an operation, living beings store in 
memory operation patterns already worked out 
previously, due to process of learning. They are ready 
to immediate use. Let us term them skills. A skill 
being performed as a corollary to reception of a 
current extrinsic stimulus is a motor response. 
At that moment, we come across a 
fundamental difference between physical reaction and 
biological response. The former does not include any 
information processing. It results from “stiff” physical 
laws. Therefore, it is easily describable 
mathematically and thus – predictable 
On the contrary, the motor operations and 
motor responses include information processing. 
Therefore, in any motor operation, the intellectual 
and motor elements are inseparably intertwined with 
each other, what makes its mathematical description 
hardly possible. 
 In addition, categorization in advance of any 
mental-motor operation as more or less “intellectually 
noble” is at least risky. For example, development of 
unusual, original solution of a specific situation in 
soccer, basketball or boxing needs by far more 
intellectual work than solving a trivial differential 
equation. 
Nevertheless, abstract reasoning has its roots 
in reality and sensory experiences. This idea may be 
traced already in the concepts by Aristotle (4th 
century B.C.), then formulated in 13th century by 
Thomas Aquinas: “Nihil est in intellectu quod non 
prius in sensu” (“nothing is in intellect that was not 
first in senses”) [4]. This statement is known as the 
peripatetic axiom. In 17th century Gottfried Leibniz 
supplemented it with the words: “excipe: nisi ipse 
intellectus” (“except the understanding itself”) [5]. As a 
result, a human mind is able to create great spaces of 
reasoning completely detached from reality. 
Nevertheless, the roots of reasoning itself – however 
abstract it may be – reside in the “tangible” reality. 
This is why mathematician Ian Stewart and biologist 
Jack Cohen termed the mental representations of 
both real and imagined world – separate, yet not 
completely independent of each other – “figments of 
reality”. Real movements and abstract thoughts are, 
then, not separate phenomena, but they make a 
consistent, continuous (yet not homogenous) system, 
from simple knee jerk through invention of general 
theory of relativity. This may be instructively 
illustrated with the following quotation from Ian 
Stewart and Jack Cohen: 
Mind is not immaterial transcendence: it is the 
response of an evolving brain to the need to 
survive in a complex environment. And with 
evolution of culture, that environment has 
become self-modifying and self-referential, and 
human mind done the same [6]. 
In human mind, one has to do with both the 
external environment – world of objects, phenomena 
and processes – and non-linearly coupled with it an 
internal environment – world of words, notions and 
thoughts, i.e., the figments of reality. One of such 
figments is the science. 
All this needs a comment. The reasoning and 
definitions presented in this paper differ from other 
models in science. However, reality is too complex to 
be fully described scientifically. As a result, each 
theory is inevitably a simplification [7-8]. As it 
Richard A. Schmidt remarked, “since laws are the 
product of human creativity, different laws can be 
formulated by two different individuals who are 
examining the same observations; laws do not 
automatically spring forth from the facts [9]. 
This may be illustrated with Fig. 1 [10]. Let 
the central body symbolize reality, and the particular 
shadows – its simplified representations, or branches 
of science. All the three shadows come from the same 
body; none is more or less true than another one; but 
nevertheless each differs distinctly from the two 
others. 
In this respect highly instructively sound the 
following words by philosopher Charles S. Peirce 
about three methods of reasoning: induction, 
deduction and abduction. 
Abduction is the process of forming an 
explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical 
operation, which introduces any new idea 
(my emphasis – WP); for induction does 
nothing but determine a value, and deduction 
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merely evolves the necessary consequences of a 
pure hypothesis. 
Deduction proves that something must be; 
Induction shows that something actually is 
operative; Abduction merely suggests that 
something may be [11-12]. 
 
Figure 1. Complex reality and its simplified scientific 
“shadows” [10]. 
 Unfortunately, abduction is the riskiest way 
of reasoning. There are no any “rails for thinking”, 
which would make it light and easy, yet acceptably 
reliable. 
2. Sciences on human movements: 
pre-motor sciences and motor 
sciences 
 According to engineer and biomechanist 
Janusz Morawski, three cornerstones of motor 
behavior of every living creature, including human, 
are energy, structure and control [13]. Important is 
that they make not a sum, but a system, i.e., “a goal-
aimed, multilayered, organized set of ideas, biological 
structure or technical device which is able to generate 
a qualitatively new ability (emergent), not resulting 
directly from traits of any of components of the system” 
[10]. 
 Let us take, then, an assumption – consistent 
with the already cited statement by Wohl – that in a 
living being the final link of a cause-effect chain, 
initiated with reception of an extrinsic stimulus, is a 
motor operation. While paraphrasing old, Latin 
adage, “all roads lead to movement”. Let us start, 
however, from the statement of polymath Mihai 
Nadin that “philosophy remains a science of sciences” 
[14]. In other words, just the philosophy is the main 
and potentially most productive figment of reality. In 
general, a system of “meta-motor sciences” might be 
designed as in Tab. 1. 
 However, it is possible to arrange the set of 
sciences – let us term them “motor sciences” – 
describing a motor operation production slightly 
differently, or to show another scientific “shadow” of 
the phenomena and processes joined with it. Let us 
focus our attention on the science directly joined with 
the motor operation production, i.e., the kinesiology. 
Its internal structure might be designed as shown in 
Table 2. 
Accordingly, one might state that psycho-
kinesiology is inseparably associated with 
biomechanics; without biomechanics, psycho-
kinesiology would be unproductive, but without 
psycho-kinesiology biomechanics would be senseless. 
Together they make inseparably joined “counties” in a 
single, general “empire” of kinesiology. 
 
3. Mathematics and system 
 The sciences on sport, exercises and other 
motor operations in humans are by far less ordered 
than, say, physics or technology. One may take an 
assumption that this is because the effectiveness and 
efficiency of mathematics in description of human 
motor behavior is by far smaller than in so-called 
exact sciences, and its possible contribution to the 
explanation of phenomena and processes underlying 
human behavior is next to zero. 
 Mathematics – allegedly, “Queen of Sciences” 
– is the science on relations [15]. It does not care 
about the essence of what it describes. In the equation 
2 + 2 = 4, it is not important, whether we speak about 
two chairs and two kangaroos, professor and 
hedgehog and smartphone and airplane. Important is 
only possibly “stiff” relation. 
Accordingly, in mathematics functions what 
might be termed “dictatorship of equal sign”. What is 
on the left side of it has to occur also on the right side. 
Even more, on either side of equation cannot appear 
something what was not on the other side. According 
to mathematician Ian Stewart and biologist Jack 
Cohen [2000, p. 234], mathematics does not give birth 
to anything new [8]. 
However, such a categorical statement seems 
to be too harsh. Mathematics is able to unveil new 
relations, and their interpretations may be 
intellectually fruitful not only in the sphere of 
mathematical “pure nonsense”. Nevertheless, the 
interpretations – which endow the mathematical 
relations with a “tangible” meaningfulness – however 
fruitful they may be, remain beyond the “main body” 
of mathematics (or “pure” mathematics). Accordingly, 
direct application of mathematics in biology, and – 
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even more – in psychology and kinesiology seems to 
be hardly reasonable. 
Interpretations include some freedom of 
concluding. Here there are no “stiff rails” for thinking 
(as, e.g., the mathematical formalism). More freedom 
means more inventiveness, indeed, but also more 
dead ends. Therefore, for a scientist, the mental 
interpretations are by far more risky than, say, light 
and easy production “new, original experimental 
data” in laboratory.  
However, just the freedom of thinking enables 
fully abstract reasoning and creation of intellectual 
worlds not directly joined with reality. In other words, 
only the reasoning methodology termed by Peirce 
“abduction” enables invention of theories and science 
as a whole [11]. 
Table 1. A general system of “meta-motor sciences”. 
PHILOSOPHY 
ENERGY STRUCTURE CONTROL 
Biochemistry 
Energy transformations 
Anatomy 
Body construction 
Psychology 
Information management 
Biophysics 
Movements’ power supply 
Physiology 
Movements’ production 
Psycho-kinesiology 
Movements’ control 
MOVEMENT 
Pedagogy, training theory, kinesiotherapy etc. 
 
Table 2. A specific system of “motor sciences”. 
 
 
KINESIOLOGY 
PSYCHO-KINESIOLOGY 
(MOTOR SCIENCE) 
Psychology Mind 
Neurophysiology Nervous system 
 
BIOMECHANICS 
Physiology Musculoskeletal system 
Physics Environment 
In mathematics, the subjects of analyses do 
not influence the relations described with equations. 
In biology they do. In this field of natural phenomena 
and processes, a non-linearity of living creatures’ 
responses to extrinsic stimuli has been shaped 
evolutionary. A living being cannot control this non-
linearity. For example, the cell membrane “knows” 
what it may allow into the cell, and what it should 
pump out. Such an ability – nonlinear in its essence – 
destroys the “stiffness” of relations, typical for 
mathematical descriptions and makes the 
effectiveness of “Queen of Sciences” by far less than 
that in physics or technology; in biology, it is 
marginal. A scientist may use it for ordering the 
superficial phenomena, but for explanation of their 
bases, the interpretations are necessary. Let us add 
that also in physics and technology useful is not the 
creative, full of fantasy and novelty mathematics, but 
boring, deprived of panache, yet reliable calculations. 
Still more difficult is the situation in psycho-
kinesiology, where the nonlinearities, which remain 
beyond the reach of mathematics, are not a relatively 
stable product of evolution, but are on-line created by 
a living being. In such a situation, the mathematical 
description is virtually impossible, because the 
relations are deprived of any “stiffness”. 
Because only the ordered body of knowledge 
deserves the noble title “science”, and in this respect, 
mathematics is hardly effective in psycho-kinesiology, 
it is necessary to use another ordering tool. Promising 
seems to be the systems theory. Though nowadays it 
is often associated with technology, it was born in the 
field of biology [16]. According to Morawski, system is 
a layered structure of transferring and 
transformation of energy and information, being built 
according to the following rules: 
1. Layers’ hierarchy rule. 
2. Layers’ autonomy rule, 
3. Scales’ conformity rule [17]. 
The first rule says that in a system exists a 
main layer. It shapes the run of processes being 
analyzed, and other layers are auxiliary to it. 
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 The second rule says that each layer is able to 
perform its task without any additional information. 
The third rule says that each of the layers has 
its own code and methods of information processing, 
i.e., the modality. It determines depth and time 
demand of information processing. In fact, both these 
factors make a specific “identity” of a system’s layer. 
Probably the most elusive – and most creative 
as well – process in a system is the communication 
between particular layers [18]. A system is able to 
produce a new, unpredictable, qualitatively new, 
emergent system effect. Just this makes a 
fundamental difference between systems and the 
objects describable mathematically. In biology, thanks 
to a system effect, the evolution was possible. Its most 
advanced product is life, and in psycho-kinesiology – 
the ability to learn and acquiring qualitatively new 
knowledge and skills. 
By the way: if one applies the system 
principles by Morawski to a system of motor sciences 
(scales’ conformity rule), one might discover that it 
seems hardly possible to achieve any significant 
scientific successes in the region of psycho-kinesiology 
as a result of researches into biomechanical issues, 
because each of the “floors” of motor sciences system 
(Tab. 2) has its own modality of information 
processing, not fully “translatable” into modality of 
another floor [10]. 
 
3.1. Systemic patterns in the 
science on human motor behavior 
 As already stated, for creation of general 
theory of systems biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy is 
credited [16]. However, already two decades earlier 
the concept of neurophysiologist Nikolai A. Bernstein 
[Bernstein, 1947] was fully consistent with the system 
concept invented by von Bertalanffy [19]. 
 In science on human motor operations, one 
might to seek the roots of such an approach already in 
achievements by Aristotle and Descartes, but in fact, 
for systemic way of reasoning in motor control in 
humans the neurologist John Huglings-Jackson 
should be credited [20]. His papers, describing three-
level mechanism of human movements’ control – as 
well as the achievements by Ivan P. Pavlov – inspired 
Bernstein, probably the most outstanding author of 
human movements’ construction theory in 20th 
century. He has built his theory on evolutionary and 
neurophysiological knowledge and termed it “the 
physiology of activity” [21]. Its simplified and easily 
accessible representation he termed “brain 
skyscraper” [22-23]. It consisted – roughly – of five 
“floors”: A through E. The rubrospinal A-level 
(paleokinetic regulation), the thalamo-pallidar B-level 
(synergies), the pyramidal-striatal C-level (subdivided 
into striatal C1 level, controlling movements of the 
whole body in space, and cortical C2-level, which 
controls the movements of working organs), cortical 
parietal-premotor D-level (level of actions) and 
cortical E-level (level of motor fantasy). In fact, 
Bernstein regarded the latter not as a single level, but 
as a group of levels [19, 24]. By the way: in his no 
doubt greatest work, “On construction of movements”, 
Bernstein only once termed C-level – very aptly – 
“half-cortical”. 
 Independently of Bernstein, physician and 
neuroscientist Paul D. MacLean [MacLean, 1985] has 
developed an analogous system description of 
movements’ control in humans [25]. His “triune brain” 
consisted of a reptile brain (arch pallium), paleo 
mammalian brain (paleo pallium) and neomammalian 
brain (neopallium) [25-26]. The ways of reasoning, 
both Bernstein’s and MacLean’s, were similar, indeed, 
but Bernstein’s theory was more detailed and 
invented 20 years earlier. Unfortunately, though 
Bernstein spoke eight languages, his main work 
[Bernstein, 1947] has been published only in Russian 
[19]. The other, more accessible book has been in 1947 
withdrawn from publication because of political 
reasons and published no sooner than in 1991, 25 
years after Bernstein’s death [22-23]. 
Bernstein analyzed the progress in motor 
potentialities in living creatures in the context of 
development of their sensory organs and central 
nervous system (CNS). Successive, more and more 
complex sensorimotor tasks which appeared in 
environment and evolutionary struggle for life forced 
the development of more and more sophisticated 
nervous structure, which were able to control more 
and more complex motor operations. According to 
Bernstein, in a motor control in humans (and other 
living beings) there is a main level, which controls the 
general run of a motor operation just being realized, 
and the lower one(s), which make what Bernstein 
termed “background”. In short, main level is 
responsible for what to do, whereas background 
level(s) – for how to do it (control and coordination). 
Moreover, the profound knowledge of 
neurophysiology is not necessary for motor control 
specialist. For instance, a good driver does not need to 
know the details of dynamics of fuel-air mix 
combustion in, say, third cylinder of the engine. 
Moreover, the excess of knowledge is in some 
situations a harmful ballast, which reduces efficiency 
of a given motor operation. This is why philosopher 
Andy Clark has formulated the “007 principle” that 
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“one needs to know only as much as you need to know 
to get the job done” [27]. Consequently, having in 
mind the Bernstein’s evolutionary and 
neurophysiological roots of human motor behavior, I 
propose another approach towards these problems, or 
creation of another “shadow” of the motor control (Fig. 
1). The Bernstein’s “brain skyscraper” is in fact of a 
structural nature. So, let us try to invent a functional 
model, symmetrical to it. It may be termed 
“modalities’ ladder” [10]. Its essence is “distilling” 
from Bernstein’s theory only the codes and methods – 
i.e., the modalities – of information processing. While 
using it, the “towing” of whole neurophysiological 
knowledge – in itself valuable, indeed – through 
reasoning being focused on motor operation control 
becomes superfluous. In short, while comparing with 
car driving; one does not need to know details of fuel 
combustion in cylinders, but s/he has merely to push 
the accelerator. It is by far simpler, yet in practice 
equally (in fact, even more) efficient. 
 
3.2. The “brain skyscraper” and 
the “modalities’ ladder” 
 Construction of the modalities’ ladder (ML), 
symmetrical to brain skyscraper (BS), needs some 
modifications in original Bernstein’s theory. The A-
level, which controls contractions of particular 
muscles, should be divided into two sub-levels: A0, 
which controls the basic muscle tonus responsible for 
posture maintaining, and A1, which controls 
particular muscles’ contractions, aimed at solving a 
specific task in environment [10]. 
 To each of the ML “rungs” may be assigned 
particular basic skill patterns. Roughly, they are 
mental structures, controlling specific motor sub-
operations (or a whole motor operation), with which 
the modality of that “rung” is able to deal efficiently 
enough. At A-level, it is coupling, at B-level – 
template, at C-level – scenario, at D-level – program. 
The E-level does not control any real motor operation, 
hence it has no its “own” basic skill pattern. The 
mental representation at this level, the idea, is not 
directly joined with reality. 
While looking at structure of the BS, at first 
glance one might term the three lower levels – A, B 
and C – “sensory levels”, whereas the two higher ones, 
D and E, “abstract levels”. However, one should have 
in mind that also sensory experiences are being 
recorded in memory as abstract engrams. Roughly, 
one might associate E-level with a specific spatial-
temporal topology, D-level – with spatial-temporal 
geometry, both C1 and C2 levels – with kinematics, B-
level – with kinetics, and A-level – with dynamics. 
From slightly different perspective – yet fully 
coherent with the already presented one – one might 
join D-level with common sense, and E-level – with 
“daydreaming”, sometimes scientifically highly 
fruitful. While associating the D-level common sense 
with spatial-temporal geometry, then the E-level 
fantasy might be joined with spatial-temporal 
topology. Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder very 
illustratively termed topology “rubber-sheet geometry” 
[28]. 
While using the poetics by Stewart and 
Cohen, one might state that D-level includes the 
“figments of reality”, whereas E-level – the “figments 
of figments of reality” (i.e., the first derivative of 
figments of reality or second derivative of reality). 
Moreover, it should be once more emphasized 
that in fact there are no “pure” motor abilities, 
because each of them has to include a mental 
element, with modality specific to its “rung” in the 
ML. 
In the BS, the “background of all 
backgrounds” is the A0 muscle tonus. Its equivalent 
in the ML is the A0 consciousness. Let us define it as 
follows: 
Consciousness – a dynamically changing 
part of quasi-static whole, multimodal 
knowledge of an individual, activated at given 
moment by perception being directed by 
attention, aimed at dealing with the task just 
being solved [29]. 
Let us notice that this definition makes the 
notion of “sub-consciousness” superfluous. The A- or 
B-level information processing modalities, though not 
translatable into D-level verbal code, produce the 
fully-fledged consciousness at A- and B-levels, 
respectively. 
While trying to embed the BS and ML in the 
system of motor sciences (Tab. 2), one might, roughly, 
assign the ML to psychology (motor operation 
invention), the BS – to neurophysiology (motor 
operation control), the movements’ production by a 
biological organism – to physiology (motor operation 
execution), and the external constraints imposed on 
such a production – to physics (implanting the 
biological motor operation into the observable 
environment). In short, the BS includes potential 
mental-motor abilities, the ML – functional motor 
skill patterns, and the elements joining the particular 
floors of BS with respective rungs of ML are motor 
operation types and control mechanisms. 
It seems worth noticing, too, that such an 
approach enables a systemic ordering of motor control 
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terminology. Just in the lack of coherent, ordered 
terminology, some scientist seek the lack of 
intellectual successes in this field of science [30]. 
 
3.3. Motor operation teaching: the 
“one level higher” principle 
 In the ML, particular “rungs” have been 
associated with specific classes of extrinsic sensory 
stimuli and/or intrinsic engrams [10]. 
What is most important for reasoning presented in 
this paper, the higher level, the more profound, but at 
the same time the more time-consuming information 
processing. It is very important in motor operations, 
in which just the temporal physical constraints are 
decisive. 
 Teacher cannot influence the proprioceptive 
A-level motor operation (reflex) pattern in learners; 
each trainee has to work out such a pattern 
individually. 
Table 3. The Bernstein’s brain skyscraper and the modalities’ ladder [10]. 
Brain skyscraper, 
mental-motor ability 
Operation type, 
control 
mechanism 
Modalities’ ladder;  
basic skill patterns 
E 
Fantazy 
Topological representation of reality  
No motor 
operation, 
Politics 
E 
Symbolic modality 
Idea 
A
0
 
M
u
ltim
o
d
a
l co
n
scio
u
sn
e
ss
 
D 
Common sense 
Geometrical representation of 
reality  
Motor 
performance, 
Strategy 
D 
Verbal modality 
Program 
A
0
 
M
u
sc
le
 t
o
n
u
s,
 p
o
s
tu
re
 m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 C2 
Net of muscle synergies, 
working organs, 
dexterity Motor habit, 
Tactics 
C 
Teleceptive modality 
Scenario 
C1 
Net of muscle synergies, 
whole body, agility 
B 
Two muscles’ synergy, 
Movements’ harmony 
Motor 
automatism, 
Technique 
B 
Contactceptive modality 
Template  
A 
Single muscle contraction 
Strength  
Motor reflex, 
Strength 
control 
A 
Proprioceptive modality 
Coupling 
At the contactceptive B-level (automatism), a 
teaching method is the guidance, active or passive 
[31]. It is applied mainly in rehabilitation. The B-level 
teacher’s action enables creation A-level muscle 
contractions pattern (coupling) in trainee. 
At the teleceptive C-level (habit), teaching 
method is the demonstration. It is applied very 
widely. The C-level demonstration enables creation of 
B-level synergies (templates) and A-level muscle 
contractions (couplings) pattern in trainee. 
By the way: already in 1852 physician 
William Carpenter observed that intense imagination 
of a motor operation results with slight muscle 
contractions [Carpenter, 1852; Czabański, 1986], For 
example, in a sleeping dog the paws and nostrils start 
to tremble, as if our four-legged friend was chasing 
something [32-33]. In sport this phenomenon 
underlies the mental training [31, 34]. 
It is worth emphasizing that Bernstein 
noticed the specific function of the C-level in the 
whole structure of movements’ production. In 1980s 
(two decades after Bernstein’s death) very 
“fashionable” scientific issue was the topic of mirror 
neurons [35-36]. In short, one might state that some 
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living creatures (including humans) have the 
“hardwired” ability to imitate of what they are just 
seeing. It is no doubt extremely important mechanism 
of learning, e.g., in children. Probably, it has 
significantly accelerated the run of evolution. In the 
ML, the sense of eyesight is being assigned to C-level. 
At the verbal D-level, not joined directly with 
any extrinsic stimulus, a teaching method is a 
description of a given motor operation. The trainee 
has to work out independently the C-level scenarios, 
B-level templates and A-level couplings. 
One might notice that creation of a motor 
control pattern at a given level is being realized under 
“management” modality specific to an adjacent higher 
level. This phenomenon explains the function of the 
E-level, which does not control any real motor 
operation. However, the abstract patterns of such 
operations, i.e., programs, are being formed under 
guidance of E-level, apparently “daydreaming”. 
Let us take as an example the flop technique 
in high jump. In no everyday activity, a human or an 
animal performs such a series of movements. Its 
abstract pattern had to be born at E-level (fantasy, 
“daydreaming”), its applicability analyzed at D-level 
(common sense), and finally realized at “sensory” 
levels – teleceptive C, contactceptive B, and 
proprioceptive A. In short, E-level endows a motor 
operation with a novelty, D-level – with an 
applicability, and the lower ones – with realizability. 
 
3.4. The “one level higher” 
principle example 
 The “one level higher” principle may be 
regarded as a development of Bernstein’s rule that 
appearance of a new, higher level in the BS induces 
the development of lower levels’ motor control 
potentialities, and, more generally, the information 
processing power [22-23]. In short, the formation of a 
higher level activates such potentialities of a lower 
one, which cannot work without presence of a higher 
one. Further, it results with a specific phase of motor 
habit formation, i.e., distribution of basic skill 
patterns among particular levels. While shaping a 
general structure of a habit, such basic skills patterns 
(templates, couplings) are being “pushed down” to 
such a level, which is able to deal with a given sub-
operation efficiently enough. Bernstein termed such 
process “automation” [22-23]. 
 By the way, it seems worth noticing that the 
word “automation” has completely different meanings 
in science on living creatures’ movements and in 
technology. In technology, it bases on strict control 
with specific measuring gauges, whereas in motor 
control it means the action with “sleeping” or even 
completely switched-off attention. Just the decreasing 
the attention load (thus making the whole motor 
operation “cheaper” in terms of information 
processing) poses the main goal of automation in 
living beings. 
 Accordingly, the “one level higher” principle 
makes a specific elaboration of the Bernstein’s ideas. 
It includes assumption that “matured” basic skill 
patterns – A-level coupling, B-level template, C-level 
scenario or D-level program – appear at first at next 
higher level than that, where they function in daily 
life; this is coherent with the hypothetical adjacent 
levels transcoding axiom [10]. The main mechanism 
of their creation is the feedback, not without reason 
regarded as being one of the greatest “inventions” of 
evolution. 
 Let us look at the Fig. 2. If an internal 
movements’ pattern, being evoked from memory with 
a stimulus, is wrong, then it will not produce desired 
changes in environment. Therefore, the error appears. 
It is identified with senses and the process of its 
correction begins with a feedback mechanism. 
Unfortunately, the feedback loop makes the whole 
motor operation by far more time-consuming. 
Nevertheless, the timing, necessary to produce any B-
level template (and, as a result, automatism), 
“resides” at C-level. Therefore, the correction of a 
given template needs engagement of this level. 
According to “one level higher” principle, such a 
slowing down results not only from “pure” existence of 
the loop, but also because it uses information 
processing modality from a higher level, which is 
more time-consuming. Nevertheless, final aim of such 
a process is complete elimination of the feedback loop. 
If it finally disappears, the informational link with a 
higher level – slower and “cleverer”, indeed, yet more 
“clumsy” – is being broken and whole information 
processing occurs efficiently enough with a modality 
characteristic for lower, swifter – yet able to deal 
effectively with the specific task – level in feedforward 
mode (Fig. 3). 
 In short, elimination of the feedback loop 
means transformation of the open skill into a closed 
skill–by far much swifter, and “cheaper” in 
information processing terms [31, 37]. It is worth 
noticing that the senses responsible for possible error 
identification are usually not switched-off completely; 
they remain not at the state “stop”, but at “stand by”. 
 The feed forward motor operation pattern 
functions with the best efficiency, i.e., optimum speed 
and precision. If it makes a slave-pattern of a greater 
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master-pattern, it integrates smoothly into the latter 
and its timing. The final motor operation is then 
quick, smooth and successful, i.e., efficient. 
 While looking at such a process from the 
perspective of ML, and having in mind the already 
cited words by Mandelstam, one had to add that the 
“working power” of the word resides at D-level, but its 
“creative power” – at E-level. In other words, the “full 
power” of D-level may reveal itself only in the 
presence of the E-level. This may be illustrated with 
the observation of child development by psychologists 
Piaget and Inhelder [28]. 
In the pre-operational stage (2-7 years), a child 
describes verbally only the items just being observed 
(C-level). In the specific operations stage (7-11 years), 
a child begins to think about reality, i.e., to produce 
logical, abstract representations of the observable 
world (D-level). In the formal operations stage (over 
11 years), a young man begins to think about 
thinking, i.e., to create in mind intellectual structures 
completely detached from sensory experiences, 
specific to E-level [10]. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The feedback and the “one level higher” principle; correction of the abstract template and real 
automatism at B-level needs information processing at C-level. 
 
Figure 3. The feedforward in the B-level automatism. The gray “Reaction identification” box symbolizes that 
it is at “stand by” state, i.e., it neither needs full attention engagement, nor initiates a feedback loop; as a 
result, it does not slow down the whole motor operation. 
However, when human experiences increased 
stress level, the feedback mode may be activated even 
if previously the proper feed forward motor control 
pattern has been already worked out. Even if it 
happens in merely one of several slave-patterns, it 
destroys the whole temporal structure – and efficiency 
– of a given master-pattern, sometimes highly 
complex and sophisticated. 
In sport, such a phenomenon is termed 
“choking”. For example, in 1993 Wimbledon Final 
(Jana Novotna vs. Steffi Graf) Novotna nearly won 
the match. However, she begun to control her 
movements very precisely, afraid of making any error. 
In motor control language, she switched on the slow 
and clumsy feedback control mode, and the winner 
became Graf [38]. 
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Symptomatic is also the statement of 2007 of 
outstanding ski jumper Adam Małysz: 
I have to switch off thinking (my emphasis – 
WP)… Before each jump I wonder, what 
should be improved. In team contest, I have 
focused my attention on preventing the delay 
of take-off. As a result, I skied too passively 
and did not take off dynamically enough – 
admits the World Cup holder [39]. 
In system-theoretical language, it means: Let the 
habits, automatisms and reflexes do their job freely 
and swiftly! In ski jumping, when the speed by take-off 
reaches 100 km/h, the real competition is not a place 
for slow by its nature D-level thinking. The respective 
motor operation patterns have to be prepared in 
advance and executed swiftly. 
Outstanding racing driver Ben Collins 
(mysterious Stig, “Top Gear”) stated: 
What defines a good driver? What 
attribute is necessary, and what merely 
useful? 
The anticipation. Racing driver is a person, 
who does not look for solutions of the problems 
that occur in a race. S/he knows those 
solutions, and when the situation comes, when 
the reaction becomes necessary, s/he simply 
performs the operations leading to its 
successful solving [40]. 
After defeat by Tyson Fury, world-boxing 
champion Vladimir Klitschko stated: 
I was in the best physical shape of my life. But 
no physical form will help unless it’s combined 
with a good psychological condition. It was not 
an injury. (…) I felt the distance. I was 
thinking too much … about counting. I had to 
work on instinct (my emphasis – WP), that 
killer instinct. I kept waiting for something 
and the opportunity to fix things. I got 
uncomfortable, and all of this has caused some 
fatigue, discouragement, even confusion [41]. 
In this context, the statement “work on 
instinct” means no doubt “to let automatisms do their 
job”. The “thinking on counting” impaired the action 
of the automatisms. 
A concise and interesting description of this 
problem comes from outstanding musician Adina 
Mornell, who maintained: 
The countless individual actions involved in 
each and every phrase are simply not readily 
available to cognition. Without automation of 
motor programs, this would be not possible. 
That is why experts learn to let go in order to 
achieve, and why the desire to control can be 
so dangerous [42]. 
In this statement, the term “let go” may be 
identified with the feedforward control mode. 
However, from the perspective of ML, the statement 
“not readily available to cognition” sounds like a 
slight dissonance, because in the ML each of the 
“rungs” has its own memory, consciousness and 
cognition; the lower level, the swifter its operation. 
Accordingly, there are no “unconscious motor 
operations”, because each of them has to be embedded 
in a consciousness and an information processing 
specific to its respective “rung” of the ML, not always 
possible to express in the verbal code. Therefore, the 
ML model eliminates some quasi-scientific “black 
boxes”, which have no strictly defined meaning in the 
science on motor control in humans (“somehow”, “in a 
sense”, “unconsciously”, “subconsciously” etc.). 
Interestingly, Bernstein refers to an example 
from the novel “Anna Karenina”, by famous writer 
Lev N. Tolstoy. He presents two mowers: an old 
peasant Tit, and “nonprofessional” landowner Levin. 
Tolstoy describes the activities of Levin as follows: 
In the midst of his toil there were moments 
during which he forgot what he was doing, 
and it came all easy to him, and at those same 
moments his row was almost as smooth and 
well cut as Tit’s. But so soon as he recollected 
what he was doing, and began trying to do 
better, he was at once conscious of all the 
difficulty of his task, and the row was badly 
mown [43]. 
It seems especially worth emphasizing that 
Tolstoy was not a motor control specialist. Therefore, 
his observations are not “underpinned” by any 
scientific “ideology”. Nevertheless, they correspond 
perfectly to the case of Novotna and Graf. 
It seems worth noticing that such an 
interpretation of “choking” is coherent with Clark’s 
“007 principle” [27]. 
 
3.5. Terminology in science on 
human movement operations: 
ordering and pigeonholing 
 The importance of language in science is 
visible not only from the psychological and 
physiological perspective of kinesiology, but also from 
mathematical perspective of physics [30]. In this 
respect highly instructively sound the following 
statement by Niels Bohr: What is that we human 
beings ultimately depend on? We depend on our words. 
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We are suspended in language. Our task is to 
communicate experience and ideas to others [44]. 
The issue of thought-language connections 
has been thoroughly investigated by psychologist Lev 
S. Vygotsky [45]. Symptomatic is the following 
fragment of the poem by Osip E. Mandelstam 
“Swallow”, cited by Vygotsky: 
The word I forgot 
Which once I wished to say. 
And voiceless thought 
Returns to shadows’ chamber. 
However, while looking from the ML 
perspective, such a phenomenon is possible only when 
a living being has fully developed D-level, i.e., it is 
able to use language. Among living creatures, only the 
species Homo sapiens mastered this ability efficiently 
enough. 
The problem of terminology ordering is by no 
means a by-product in the process of science creation 
(including motor control). In fact, it is extremely 
important, because in the process of science creation, 
the words at first describe reality, but then they make 
a “basic stuff” for abstract scientific theories and 
whole science disciplines. In short, reality consists of 
observable things, phenomena and processes, whereas 
science is “woven” of abstract words, notions and 
theories. Therefore, the value of science directly 
depends on the quality of terminology. Moreover, 
along with the development of our understanding of 
the world, which is accompanied by the progress in 
science, the terminology has to evolve ceaselessly. 
Therefore, modifying and perfecting the language that 
mirrors our knowledge of the world is in fact a “never 
ending story”. Moreover, it is the basic, and not 
merely subsidiary, process in science creation. 
 As already stated, just in the lack of a proper 
language, some scientists seek the source of too slow 
progress in movements’ science [30]. It is no doubt 
right, simply evident. It is worth noticing that the 
Bernstein’s BS bases on neurophysiological and 
evolutionary knowledge, whereas the ML has been 
founded on the abstract, logical – verbal – 
development of Bernstein’s achievements. One has to 
emphasize that abstract concepts and hypotheses are 
full-fledged “citizens” of science. Even more, just in 
this region reside the sources of science. Let us 
remind that only properly ordered knowledge 
deserves the noble title of “science”. Therefore, some 
ordering is necessary, indeed, but if a scientist crosses 
the elusive and hardly discernible border, it 
transforms into pigeonholing. The former is genuine 
scientific work, whereas the latter – quasi-scientific 
“wishful thinking”. This makes a difference between 
ordering and harnessing the science and making it 
unmovable and intellectually clumsy. The former 
marks out the way towards progress, whereas the 
latter leads to petrification and paralysis of any 
mental methodology. Nevertheless, scientists usually 
strive for classification of their ideas according to an 
already existing system, and not to look for novelty 
and discoveries, both real and mental (what is by far 
more intellectually risky). If something does not 
match the already existing scientific pigeonholes, is in 
advance rejected as “moonwalking” or “daydreaming”. 
In this context, let us remind that such 
“daydreamers” as, say, Isaac Newton, Max Planck, 
Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, Niels Bohr, 
Albert Einstein or Peter Higgs – to name only some of 
Giants in physics – took their intellectual power just 
from their “daydreaming”. Consequently, just this 
thinking mode made physics the main engine of the 
whole science in the course of recent nearly four 
centuries. In this context highly instructively sound 
also the words by physician and biologist Thomas H. 
Huxley, who stated that “every great advance in 
natural knowledge has involved the absolute rejection 
of authority”. No wonder that the scientific authorities 
– often dignified and powerful – do not like it. 
 It is worth noticing that one of the basic rules 
of very fruitful methodology of intellectual work, the 
brainstorming, consists in avoiding any evaluation of 
new ideas at the stage of their creation. 
In motor control, it was often disputed, 
whether Bernstein’s theory is of motor, or rather 
action nature. Such disputes obscured his greatest 
achievements. While looking from such a perspective 
one might – roughly – say that the “sensory” levels, A, 
B, and C, are of action (ecological), whereas the 
“purely mental” levels, D (common sense) and E 
(“daydreaming”) – rather of motor (programming) 
nature. One might say that here a scientist comes 
across the problem analogous to physical wave-
particle duality in the nature of light. In this respect, 
it is worth emphasizing that the matter of 
movements’ control in living creatures is by far more 
complex than that of physics. By the way: the fierce 
disputes about open loop and closed loop motor 
control, about motor approach and action approach – 
in fact, aimed at science harnessing rather, and not at 
ordering it – needed much work and effort of many 
scientists all over the world. Even if useful at a 
specific stage of science development, they had later 
to be broken – according to advice by Huxley – to 
enable a real progress. It shows, how risky and 
treacherous is the only way towards theory (and 
science as a whole) production – the elusive, 
hazardous, mysterious, bumpy abduction path, lined 
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with cadavers of those, who had no scientific luck 
enough. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 The presented paper follows the way marked 
out by Bernstein. His “starting point” was also 
biomechanics, but his way towards explanation of the 
mechanisms underlying different motor operations 
led through the “county of evolution and 
neurophysiology”. It resulted with creation of 
physiology of activity, which may be symbolized by 
the brain skyscraper. On the other hand, the way 
towards similar explanation presented in this paper 
leads through the “shire of information processing”. It 
resulted with invention of the modalities’ ladder, 
parallel to the brain skyscraper, indeed, yet unveiling 
another scientific perspective. Both these mental 
structures might be regarded as being two different 
“shadows” of the same science on motor operations 
development and control in humans (Fig. 1). 
 According to the “one level higher” principle, 
one might try to solve the problem presented by 
Vygotsky, who stated: 
In animals, even in anthropoids whose speech 
is phonetically like human speech and whose 
intellect is akin to man’s, speech and thinking 
are not interrelated [45]. 
Why? While looking from the ML perspective, 
and the Bernstein’s lower levels’ development 
principle, the answer sounds: Because the ape has no 
E-level developed in its BS (and, consequently, in its 
ML). As a result, its D-level does not include the 
abilities, which occur only in the presence of the 
higher, E-level. Accordingly, its “word” has merely a 
“working power”, and not a “creative power”. On the 
other hand, in humans, who have quite good 
developed E-level, just the creative power of language 
enabled invention of, e.g., culture and science. 
The concepts presented in this paper may be 
regarded as a supplement to biomechanical 
qualitative analysis. It deals with the observable 
outcomes of the psychological processes, which cannot 
be directly followed. However, only both observable 
physical and unobservable psychological processes 
may explain the fascinating phenomenon of human 
motor operations creation and control. The operations 
themselves are quite easily observable and 
measurable experimentally, whereas towards the 
psychological processes leads only a narrow, 
treacherous, full of traps and dead ends path of 
abduction. Therefore, the contemporary motor control 
needs “daydreamers” to make new inventions, and the 
functional, logical terminology – to order them and to 
incorporate smoothly into the already existing system 
of knowledge, i.e., the science. In short – to protect the 
valuable scientific thought from the fate described by 
Mandelstam. If it really deserves it… 
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